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 GROWTH AND VOLATILITY 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper has two objectives. First, to establish empirically a U-shaped relation between GDP 
growth rate and income volatility. The backward as well as the fast-growing countries have had 
extensive volatility; but developed nations by contrast have enjoyed much more stable income. 
Second, to present a macroeconomic model to study how growth and volatility evolve together. 
The twin endogenous variables are financial liberalization interacting with liquidity constraints. 
Opening LDC financial markets could raise or lower their long-term income and growth rates, 
depending on the severity of existing liquidity constraints. Financial liberalization and removing 
financial market imperfections unambiguously worsen income volatility. (JEL E32, O16) 
 
 
2 
 There is little doubt that economic development profoundly influences and is influenced 
by the social, economic and political fabrics of a society. In this complex interaction several key 
variables evolve together and their co-movements are well-documented in the literature. Simon 
Kuznets (1955) discovers the inverted-U-shaped relation between GDP per capita and the 
distribution of income. Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992, 1995), Robert Barro, 
Gregory Mankiw and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1995), Gregory Mankiw, David Romer and David 
Weil (1992), Peter Klenow and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare (1997) and others find a negative 
relation between income and growth rate and thus establish with varying degrees of confidence a 
pattern of income convergence. Mariano Torras and James Boyce (1998), Hemamala Hettige, 
Muthukumara Mani and David Wheeler (2000), and Erwin Bulte and Daan van Soest (2001) find 
a Kuznet-type of relation between GDP per capita and some pollution indices.  
 Is the speed of growth also related to volatility and business cycles? The first of two 
objectives of this paper is to unify some conflicting evidence that has emerged in the recent 
literature. Roger Kormendi and Philip Meguire (1985), Inspired by Fisher Black (1979) who 
argues that high returns are necessary rewards to risk taking, show that mean real GDP growth 
rates over the period of 1950's to 70's for forty-six countries are positively and significantly 
related to the standard deviation of real GDP growth rates over the same period. Their reported 
regression coefficient of 0.53 implies that emerging countries such as South Korea, which has 
had mean growth rate (7.3 percent) roughly twice of that of the US (3.5 percent)1, would expect 
about fifty percent higher income volatility (3.8 percent standard deviation of growth rates for 
Korea vis-à-vis 2.7 percent for US). Kevin Grier and Gordon Tullock (1989), using a wider 
pooled sample of 113 countries, again find a positive and significant regression coefficient of 
0.17. However, when Grier and Tullock (1989) divide the sample into regions, the coefficient is 
positive and significant only for Africa (0.152), but negative and not significant for Americas  
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 (-0.051) and Asia (-0.133). Contrarily, Garey Ramey and Valerie Ramey (1995) use a 92-
countries Robert Summers and Alan Heston (1991) data and find that "countries with higher 
volatility have lower growth" (p.1138).2 
Section I of the present paper establishes, using two separate data sets to improve 
robustness, a snap-shot U-shaped relation between grows and volatility (see Figure 1). The 
backward and often negative-growth countries, many of them from Africa, and the fastest 
growing ones, many of them from Asia, have suffered the greatest volatility. The developed 
countries on the other hand, mainly from Europe and North America, have enjoyed much more 
stable income by comparison. 
 
Put Figure 1 about here 
 
 What lie behind this proposed U-shaped growth-volatility relation? First of all, agrarian 
societies and those relying on primitive production are particularly vulnerable to floods, 
droughts, diseases and other natural calamities. This probably explains why poor and contracting 
African countries suffer from extraordinary volatility. Unfortunately, for those embarking on an 
industrialize drive, the road to prosperity is equally treacherous and unyielding. Historians (Eric 
Hobsbawm, 1968; Alexander Gerschenkron, 1962; Douglass North and Robert Thomas, 1973;  
Nathan Rosenberg and L.E. Birdzell, Jr. 1986) have described how industrialization in England 
and Europe brought revolutionary changes to their economies and their societies. In many ways 
the experience of newly industrializing countries is also harrowing. As followers they have to 
catch up, which necessitates growing at an extraordinary speed. Led by Japan, Asian countries 
such as Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have sustained a remarkable growth rate of 
five to seven percent over several decades. Such results however are often achieved by targeting 
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 certain growth industries at the expense of diversification.3 Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio 
Zilibotti (1997) and Aart Kraay and Jaume Ventura (2001) show that a risk-return tradeoff 
explains the positive association between growth and volatility. Mature capitalist economies on 
the other hand, well-diversified and grew steadily at two to three percent per annum, have 
enjoyed much lower volatility by comparison as they sit 'comfortably' at the trough of the U-
shaped relation shown in Figure 1.  
 But diversification is unlikely to account for everything behind the growth-volatility 
nexus. The recent financial crises in Asia and South America have revealed itself to be a clear 
suspect for investigation. A large literature now exists on capital flows, liquidity constraints, and 
financial market development. Many have established theoretically (Jeremy Greenwood and 
Boyan Jovanovic, 1990; Valerie Bencivenga and Bruce Smith, 1991; Gilles Saint-Paul, 1992; 
Valerie Bencivenga, Bruce Smith and Ross Starr, 1996) and empirically (Geert Bekaert, 
Campbell Harvey and Christian Lundblad, 2001) that financial market development sustains 
growth. Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore (1997) show that liquidity-constrained markets rely 
on collaterals such as properties to secure loans, leading to a mechanism that magnifies business 
cycles. More recently and after the Asian financial crisis of 1997 Guillermo Calvo (1998) and 
Enrique Mendoza (2001) argue that it is the “sudden stops” instead of foreign fund inflows that 
cause a crash. Graciela Kaminsky and Reinhart Carmen (1999) point out that financial 
liberalization often precedes such sudden stops. Roberto Chang and Andres Velasco (2001) 
demonstrate that financial liberalization can aggravate the illiquidity of banks, thus increases 
their vulnerability.  
All these models just mentioned focus on either growth or volatility, but not the joined 
evolution of both. The second half of the present paper therefore attempts to build a 
macroeconomic model to complement the above literature. It establishes that financial 
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 liberalization in liquidity-constrained countries can either promote or retard growth, but it must 
unambiguously increase volatility. This conclusion is consistent with a view that seems to be 
gaining momentum at present (Christopher Gilbert, Andrew Powell and David Vines, 1999; Paul 
Collier and Jan Willem Gunning, 1999), which argues that premature financial liberalization has 
been flawed and financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank should redefine their 
roles in facilitating economic development and in crises management. The model presented 
below lends theoretical backing to such policy recommendations. Another novel result emerges 
from this model that removing financial market imperfection also worsens income volatility.  
The following sections are organized as follows. Section I shows, using the Summers and 
Heston (1991) data and the World Bank (1995) World Data separately, that a U-shaped curve 
exists between growth and volatility. Section II presents a macroeconomic model to explain the 
tail part of the U-shaped curve. Section III concludes the paper. 
 
I. The Empirics of Growth and Volatility: a U-Shaped Curve  
 
Ramey and Ramey (1995, p.1140) find, using a 92-country Summers and Heston (1991) 
sample from 1962 to 1985 (data reproduced in Table 1 below), 
(1) 
)3.2()7.7(
057.0,154.0030.0 2
−
=−=∆ Ry ii σ      
where iy∆  is mean per capita annual growth rate from 1962-85 and iσ  is its standard deviation. 
Ramey and Ramey (1995) also use OECD country samples (not reproduced here), and the 
coefficient for iσ  turns out to be positive but not significant (+0.147, t statistics is 0.67), R2 = 
0.02. When controlling for initial investment share of GDP, initial population growth rate, initial 
human capital, initial per capita GDP and other trend variables, both the Summer and Heston 
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 sample and the OECD sample yield a consistently negative and significant coefficient (for 
Summer and Heston -0.178, t statistics -2.43; for OECD 949.0− , t statistics -4.09). From this 
they conclude that "countries with higher volatility have lower growth." (p.1138).  
 
Put Table 1 about here 
 
Put Figure 2 about here 
 
 The weak R-square reported in Ramey and Remay’s study just quoted is a matter of 
concern. Since growth rate and standard deviation are probably both endogenously determined, it 
matters little as to which one to put on the Y-axis, and Figure 2 plots standard deviation against 
mean growth rate from the 92-country sample. On inspection it is not clear if the relation is really 
linear. Again using the 92-country data, putting instead standard deviation as the dependent 
variable and adding a quadratic term, the OLS regression result turns out to dominate the linear 
regression (1) 
(2) 
)21.2()07.3()74.13(
.11.013.002.142.6 2
2
−
=∆+∆−= Ryy iiiσ  
A U-shaped curve clearly gives a better fit to the data than the linear model in Ramey and Ramey 
(1995). 
 The regression can be fined in a number of ways. In Figure 2 only six out of the 92 have 
standard deviation above 10 percent. These countries are, in descending order of standard 
deviation Iraq (17.47%), Nicaragua (13.35%), Uganda (12.59%), Iran (11.21%), Algeria 
(11.64%) and Syria (10.25%). Historical record readily shows that each of these seven countries 
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 suffered either protracted war or national disasters during this period of 1962 to 1985.4 Eliminate 
the six countries the remaining 86-countries yields  
(3) 
)17.4()48.5()65.20(
26.015.008.184.5 2
2
−
=∆+∆−= Ryy iiiσ  
which is a significant improvement from both regressions (1) and (2).  
Splitting the U-shaped curve into three piece-wise linear segments yields further insights. 
The first group, taken as those with mean growth rate less than two percent per year, thirty-eight 
countries in total, yields the following OLS relation 
(4) 
)44.2()9.18(
.14.064.002.6 2
−
=∆−= Ryiiσ     
Eighteen of the twenty-two African countries fall into this category, and eight among 
them have negative mean annual growth rates from 1962 to 1985. Regression (4) implies that a 
one percent slower growth, such as Liberia’s –0.83 percent compared to Malawi’s 0.88 percent, 
would lead to a 2/3 percentage point rise in volatility (Malawi’s standard deviation is 5.31 
percent compared to Liberia’s 6.22 percents). 
The second group, taken as those with mean growth rate between two to three percents, 
twenty-five countries in total, yields an insignificant OLS coefficient for mean growth rate 
 with t-ratio –0.04 and R-square 7.05×1005.0− -5. For this group growth is not related to 
volatility, which has a mean standard deviation of 3.83 percents. The US, UK, Germany, France 
and most other European developed nations are found in this category. 
The third category, taken as those with mean growth rate greater than three percent per 
annum, twenty-two countries in total, yields the following OLS result 
(5) 
)66.2()19.1(
.26.063.028.1 2 =∆+= Ryiiσ      
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 Although several European countries such as Norway, Finland and Italy fall into this category, 
rather more conspicuous are several newly industrializing countries, namely South Korea, 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan situated at the tail end of the U-shaped curve with high 
growth rate and standard deviation up in the 4-percent region. Regression (5) implies that a one 
percent faster growth rate is associated with 2/3-percentage point greater volatility (compare 
Singapore’s 5.9 percent growth and 4.46 percent standard deviation with Thailand’s 3.82 percent 
growth and 2.97 percent standard deviation). 
 To boost robustness the above exercise is repeated on a 66-country sample extracted from 
the World Bank's World Data of 1995. The list of countries with their 29-year mean growth rates 
and standard deviation of annual growth from 1964-1993 is presented in Table 2. The scattered 
plot of the sample is presented in Figure 3.5  
 
Put Table 2 about here 
 
Put Figure 3 about here 
 
 The quadratic regression equation for the 66-country data is 
(6) 
)03.5()94.3()49.11(
.3.007.2221.101.5 2
2
−
=∆+∆−= Ryy iiiσ    
and it clearly bears a close resemblance to that from Summers and Heston data reported in 
regression (3) above. 
 Instead of splitting into piece-wise categories, two debt-related explanatory variables are 
obtained -  
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 (1) debt/GDP(1993) = total debt stock at year t / GDP at 1993 (last year of data); 
(2) = [debt/GDP(93)-debt/GDP(71)]/ [debt/GDP(71)]. )9371(% −∆debt
 A quadratic regression including the two debt-related variables for the 66-country data 
gives 
(7) 
)04.2()14.1()04.4()42.2()38.6(
)9371(%78.0)93(/01.044.1883.096.3
2
−
−∆++∆+∆−= debtGDPdebtyy iiiσ   
with R2 = 0.36. Again the U-shaped relationship between growth and volatility is clear 
discernable. In addition, increase in indebtedness has a positive and significant impact on 
volatility.  
Two possible explanations for the U-shaped curve, such as climatic uncertainty on its 
falling segment, and risk-return tradeoff on the rising segment, were briefly examined in the 
introductory section above. It was argued that the impact of external debt on growth and 
volatility is not well understood. Debt, growth, and volatility, are all likely to be endogenously 
determined.  More truly exogenous variables are liquidity constraints in consumption and 
investment, or financial liberalization that is often used as a condition for securing loans. How 
would they interact in the evolution of growth and volatility? In order to shed light on this 
question a simple model is presented in the next section.  
 
II. Growth, Volatility and Liquidity Constraints: a Theoretical Exploration 
 
Consider the accounting identity at time t between income Y, foreign capital net inflow F, 
consumption C, investment I, government expenditure G (assumed exogenous):  
(8) .      ttttt GICFY ++=+
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 In order to put liquidity constraints and financial liberalization center-stage, the dynamic 
character of this system of income determination arises from capital flow Ft, which is linked to 
the past via interest payments on accumulated debt stock.6  
Financial liberalization refers to measures that open a country's financial market to 
foreign influences: abolishing credit controls, deregulating interest rates, relaxing entry into the 
banking and the financial services industry, privatizing the banking sector, and freeing 
international capital-flows. The World Bank often advocates these policies as conditions to grant 
development loans, and the IMF would use them as conditions for extending help in crisis 
management. As policy measures it will be treated as exogenous in what follows. A 
distinguishing characteristic of financial liberalization is that it can be implemented within a 
relatively short period of time.  
By contrast, another set of variables, to be called 'liquidity constraints' below, evolves 
only slowly and it cannot be easily altered by government or institutional policies. There exists 
evidence in the literature indicating especially in less developed countries that consumption 
(Robert Hall, 1978; Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pagano, 1989), and investment (Carolyn Jenkins, 
1998; Joshua Greene and Delano Villanueva, 1991; Leonce Ndikumana, 1999, 2000), are both 
subject to liquidity constraints. For instance, the manner and the ease with which credits are 
extended and secured evolve with the social culture and the economic habits of a nation. Jappelli 
and Pagano (1989) report that nearly half (45%) of all housing loans in the US and the UK are 
extended to homebuyers 29 years or younger, but this occurs much more rarely in Japan and 
Italy (17% and 21% respectively). They also show that such phenomena owe at least partly to 
liquidity constraints being less tight in the US and the UK. In many instances liquidity 
constraints reflects market imperfections, which are so ingrained into supply and demand 
behavior that only democratization, strengthening of the rule of law, adoption of international 
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 accounting and banking practices are capable of relaxing liquidity constraints. Further, market 
imperfections abound in investment credits allocation in LDCs such as Indonesia, Thailand, the 
Philippines or China PRC. Those who have close connections (guan-xi in China and cronyism in 
Indonesia) with central government or bank officials invariably have easier access to money 
credits than others. Like financial liberalization, liquidity constraints are treated as exogenous in 
what follows. Unlike financial liberalization, they evolve slowly and will play the role of 
parameters instead of policy instruments. 
The variables that appear in equation (8) will now be discussed in detail.  
 
A.  Capital Flows 
 
  The flow of foreign funds, denoted , consists of two parts: fresh loan (denoted ) and 
debt servicing ( rD , where r is exogenous and constant international interest rate and D
tF tL
t t is 
cumulated debt stock outstanding at t).7 Hence  
(9) .        ttt rDLF −=
Fresh loan and debt servicing will now be examined in turn. 
 Foreign loans reflects foreign investment, which is attracted by economic development of 
a country, which is in turn captured primarily by growth rates ).( 1−− tt YY  Foreign loans can 
therefore be written as ).( 10 −− tt YYβ  The focus of this model is very much on ,0β  which gauges 
how open a country is to international financial markets. A country totally closed to foreign 
capital markets would have 00 =β . Financial liberalization measures will be modeled as a rise 
in .0β  
(10) .0),( 010 >−= − ββ ttt YYL       
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  Debt stock at t,  may be thought of as having been accumulated since a long time ago, 
and it is simplest and perfectly general to take it to the extreme: 
tD
(11) .      ∞−−− ++++= LLLLD tttt ...21
Using equation (10) and summing,  
( ) ( )∞−∞−−−−−− −=−+−+−+− YYYYYYYYY ttttttt 0322110 ... ββ . 
For convenience and without loss of generality assume Y  to be so negligible that both can be 
ignored. This gives  
∞−
(12) tt YD 0β= ,        
and finally  
(13) ( )[ 10 1 −−−⋅= ttt YYrF ]β .      
As mentioned earlier, foreign funds in the form of equation (13) link current variables to 
past incomes and provide the dynamic element in what follows.  
 
B.  Consumption 
 
On the determination of consumption, recent empirical work has found little support for 
the life-cycle permanent incomes (LC-PI) theories (Marjorie Flavin, 1981; Hall and Mishkin, 
1982; Fumio Hayashi 1982). Instead there is growing evidence (Hall, 1978; Jappelli and Pagano, 
1989, discussed above) that liquidity constraints significantly determine consumption behavior 
especially in developing countries. Apart from market imperfection, liquidity constraints tighten 
with accumulated debt stock outstanding. The more one has borrowed, the more reluctant will 
lenders offer fresh loans, under a given (imperfect) market setting.  
For the problem at hand a linear consumption function will suffice: 
13 
 (14) ttt DccYC ~−= , 
where 0 < c < 1 is the marginal propensity to consume. For convenience a labeling convention 
will henceforth be adopted - that a parameter z reflecting liquidity constraints will be denoted z~ . 
Here c~ > 0 rises with the severity of the constraint on consumption, given the debt already 
incurred. The interactive term tDc~  in (14) means that a rise in Dt puts a brake on consumption. 
The brake is harder if  c~  is large, as would be the case in a country with badly-developed 
financial infrastructure.  
 
C. Investment 
  
Like consumption, investment is subject to liquidity constraints. Empirical evidence 
shows that development in the financial infrastructure encourages domestic investment but 
external indebtedness discourages it (Jenkins, 1998; Greene and Villanueva, 1991; Ndikumana, 
2000). The idea of "debt overhang" discussed in Paul Krugman (1988) points to a similar but 
slightly subtler relation. A debt overhang creates a tradeoff between financing and forgiving a 
debt for the creditors. The debt therefore distorts domestic investment incentives since "the 
benefits of good performance go largely to creditors rather than itself" (Krugman (1988), p. 253). 
The more indebted a debt-overhang country is, the less incentive there is to invest in good 
projects.  
 Again a linear form for investment suffices to capture such liquidity-constrained 
investment: 
(15) tt DiriII
~−−= , 
14 
 where I  is autonomous (depreciation-related) consumption, i is interest-sensitivity of 
investment, r is the lending rate and for convenience taken to be the same as the rate on which 
debts are serviced. The parameter i~  constrains investment given debt stock Dt.  A country with 
a lesser developed financial market has a higher value of i~ . 
 
D.  Long-Term Stationary Income 
 
 Using equations (9), (12), (13), (14) and (15) in (8) and solving for Yt yields 
(16) , KAYY tt =− −1
where 
(17) 
)~~1()1( 0
0
rcic
A −+++−= β
β
, 
(18) 
)~~1()1(
)(
0 rcic
riIG
K −+++−
−+= β .     
 On inspection it is immediate that A > 0 and K > 0 hold. The long-term stationary 
equilibrium income is given by the particular integral of the first-order difference equation (16) 
(19) 
)~~()1(
)(
0 rcic
riIG
Yp −++−
−+= β .      
 
PROPOSITION 1: Short-term financial liberalization  Y



lowers
raises
p if .
)~~(
)~~(




>+
<+
ric
ric  
PROOF. )~~(
0
cir
d
dYp −−=αβ  where 0)]~~()1[(
)(
2
0
0 >−++−
−+=
rcic
riIG
βα  from (20). 
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  Thus financial liberalization raises longer-term steady state income (and short-term 
growth rate en route to the steady state) if the liquidity constraints are not too tight, i.e. if the 
banking and other financial infrastructure of the economy is sufficiently well developed. The 
main insight from Proposition 1, however, is that premature liberalization of the financial 
market lowers long-term steady state income and growth. The reason is as follows. Financial 
liberalization encourages inflow of foreign debts according to equation (10). Such funds are 
made available for domestic spending which creates multiple expansions of current income. The 
resulting increase in debt, however, tightens liquidity constraints and reduces consumption and 
investment (equations (14) and (15)). If the constraint-induced falls in consumption and 
investment outweigh the initial expansion, income falls. 
 It is interesting to note from Proposition 1 that the higher is interest rate r, the less likely 
would financial liberalization adversely effect steady state income. The reason is that interest rate 
reduces net foreign fund inflow via debt servicing (equation (9)), thus curbing the funds-induced 
rounds of income expansion. Less debt is accumulated as a result (equations (10), (11) and (12)), 
and this counteracts the additional constraints on consumption and investment. 
It is simple and routine to check that 0~ <cd
dYp  and 0~ <id
dYp ; thus long-term improvement 
in the financial infrastructure and the reduction in financial market imperfection unambiguously 
raise steady state income and growth. Infrastructural reform is a much safer policy than financial 
liberalization, as Jeffrey Sachs (1997) and Joseph Stiglitz (2001), among others, have argued 
repeatedly. 
16 
 E.  Volatility 
 
 The complementary function of the first-order difference equation (16) is given by 
(20) , tc AY )(Φ=
where  is an arbitrary constant having a scaling effect on income volatility. Volatility is 
fundamentally governed by the sign and the magnitude of 
Φ
)~~1()1( 0
0
rcic
A −+++−= β
β  (from 
equation (17)). In the World Data all relevant lending rates average to about 10 percent for the 
period 1964-93. In any case it is safe to assume that long-term lending rates do not persist above 
100 percent per annum. The following result is then easy to establish. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose r<1 holds, then 
(i) The dynamic system represented by equations (16) to (18) is stepwise convergent. 
(ii) A rise in 0β , i.e. financial liberalization unambiguously worsens volatility. 
(iii) A fall in c~  or i~ , i.e. reducing liquidity constraints in consumption or investment, 
again unambiguously worsens stability. 
PROOF: First, r<1 implies 0< A <1, which establishes (i).  
Second, 0
)]~~1(1[
)1(
2
00
>−+++−
−=
ricc
c
d
dA
ββ , which proves (ii).  
Finally, 0
)]~~1(1[~~ 20
0 <−+++−
−==
riccid
dA
cd
dA
β
β
, which proves (iii).  
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 Proposition 2(i) says that after an exogenous shock forces current GDP off its long-term 
steady state, the shock will eventual wear off but the time it takes for GDP to return to its steady 
state is longer the larger is the size of A. 
In order to understand 2(ii) and 2(iii) it is important to understand the dynamic elements 
that links current variables to past variables. The stronger is such element, the longer GDP would 
linger off its steady state and greater would be volatility measured in terms of standard deviation 
of GDP. The  first dynamic link hinges on 0β , which attracts foreign funds, which in turn 
translates into expenditures and multiple expansions in income. The bigger is 0β , the longer 
would such after-shocks linger on and the greater would be volatility. This explains Proposition 
2(ii). 
But external inflows of funds accumulate into debt stocks. The second dynamic link 
hinges on consumption and investment, or more precisely on the brake applied on consumption 
and investment by external debt stock accumulated. At one extreme when liquidity constraints 
are prohibitively tight, any external shock in the form of external inflows of funds would be 
immediately dissipated before transmitting into additional consumption and investment. At the 
other extreme when liquidity constraints are very slack, the effect of foreign funds inflow on 
consumption and investment would be totally unhindered, and the multiple expansions on 
income would be at its maximum. This is why tight liquidity constraint reduces volatility and 
conversely, as stated in Proposition 2(iii). 
By way of practical implication Proposition 2(iii) is provocative and somewhat 
discouraging. While opinion have been mounting that premature financial liberalization may do 
more harm than good to a developing nation, few would perhaps expect removing financial 
market imperfection to have the perverse effect of worsening volatility. The model and the last 
18 
 paragraph point out how it could happen. More empirical and theoretic research is well justified 
in this direction. 
A final and simple result may be stated as follows. 
 
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose r<1. Increases in c or r unambiguously worsen volatility.  
PROOF: 0>
dc
dA  and 0>
dr
dA . 
 
 A greater marginal propensity to consume allows an external shock to have greater 
impact on consumption, pushing current GDP further off its long-term steady state and requiring 
a longer time for GDP to return to the steady state. Interest rate according to equations (9) and 
(13) constitutes another dynamic link between current and past income. 
The effect of interest rate on volatility can be understood as follows. Suppose an external 
shock lifts current income temporarily to a higher level. There will be an inflow of foreign funds 
in response to the higher income. The higher is interest rate, income would have to stay longer 
above the original level in order to service the result rise in debt stock. 
According to the World Data, Asian countries have 64.0≅c , compared to  c  for 
South American countries and  for African countries. On this alone  Asian countries 
should have less volatility. By the same token, the high lending rate in the 1980's may be partly 
to blame for the greater instability in the 1980's than the 60's. This is consistent with the view 
held by many in the economic and financial profession. 
73.0≅
71.0≅c
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 III.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
 Though many questions about growth and volatility remain, the twin objectives set out in 
this essay have to a large extent been achieved. First, it has unified conflicting evidence in the 
literature, which sometimes reports a positive association between growth and volatility 
(Kormendi and Meguire (1985); Grier and Tullock (1989)), yet at other times a negative one 
(Ramey and Ramey (1995)). Section I above establishes that the relation is more likely a U-
shaped one. Added confidence is achieved by repeating the exercise on two separate data sets - 
the Summers and Heston (1991) and the World Bank (1995) World Data. In addition, country 
indebtedness is found to have a positive impact on volatility. 
It is important to emphasize that this U-shaped curve is a cross-sectional snap-shot of 
nations at different stages of their economic development. It is not a sequential growth path that 
a country would go through. It does not predict for instance that a poor African nation could 
greatly reduce her volatility by embarking on an industrialization drive. On the contrary, as the 
experience of newly industrializing nations has shown, the path to prosperity is indeed far from 
plain sailing. Just as backwardness implies a high degree of income volatility because of climatic 
and other uncertainties, so too is the catching up process a bumpy one albeit for a different set of 
reasons. Fortunately however, there is light at the end of the tunnel of growth. Successful 
industrialization offers not only a high level of income, but also reduced volatility, as the 
developed nations situated at the trough of the U-shaped curve aptly demonstrate. 
 The second objective of this paper is to understand what lies behind the U-shaped 
growth-volatility nexus. A number of plausible explanations already exist – that primitive 
production is at the peril of natural uncertainties, that industrialization is inherently hazardous, 
and that catching up implies industrial targeting and the inability to spread one’s eggs in too 
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 many baskets. What is less well understood is the impact of financial liberalization and liquidity 
constraints on growth and volatility. The dynamic macroeconomic model in Section II of this 
paper addresses this issue. A number of insights emerge from solving a first order difference 
equation of this model. Some of the conclusions are intuitive, others more novel and provocative. 
 First, financial liberalization raises long-term steady state income and thus growth rate if 
the liquidity constraints on consumption and investment are not too tight; but it reduces income 
and growth rate otherwise (Proposition 1). In addition, financial liberalization invariably and 
unambiguously worsens income volatility (Proposition 2(ii)). Countries such as Indonesia, the 
Philippines, or Thailand where severe liquidity constraints exist owing to extensive financial 
market imperfections (e.g. non-transparent banking and lending practices and primitive 
accounting standards), overt financial liberalization such as those recommended by international 
financial institutions at the beginning of the 1990’s would lead not only to fluctuations but also 
lower long-term income. This much seems to have been borne out by the recent financial crisis 
in Asia. 
 Second, relaxation of liquidity constraints by eliminating financial market imperfections 
no doubt raises long-term national income and growth, but it is found to have an unambiguously 
adverse effect on volatility (Proposition 2(iii)). What lies behind this result is the fact that lower 
liquidity constraint opens the economy to the ebbs and flows of foreign capital, and consequently 
every external shock asserts greater influence on consumption, investment, and national income. 
This result is novel, almost provocative, and opens a new direction for research that could prove 
important and fruitful in the future. 
 Two caveats of this paper should be mentioned in closing. First, the regressions 
performed in Section I are meant only to establish the pattern of relations between growth and 
volatility, not causality. It is believed that both are determined by some other variables such as 
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 debt, financial flows, or technology. It would indeed be interesting and important to develop 
more sophisticated econometric tests to discriminate between competing explanations for the 
growth – volatility nexus. This is left as a topic for future research. 
 Second, the macroeconomic system of Section II, which involves a simple first-order 
difference equation, strictly speaking solves for long-term steady state income only. A rise in 
steady state income necessitates growth in the short-term in order to reach the higher level of 
income. It would indeed be interesting and important to reexamine the growth – volatility 
relation from, for example, the angle of human capital accumulation and increasing returns. 
Again this is left for future research.  
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 Table 1. 92-country Summers and Heston (1991) data for the years 1962-85* 
  Mean SD   Mean SD 
Africa Algeria (DZA) 3.34 11.64 Asia Afghanistan (AFG) -0.28 4.26 
 Botswana (BWA) 6.85 7.39  Bangladesh (BGD) 0.39 8.17 
 Ghana (GHA) -0.97 5.08  Burma (BUR) 2.75 5.45 
 Kenya (KEN) 1.76 5.58  Hong Kong (HKG) 5.97 4.05 
 Lesotho (LSO) 5.35 8.46  India (IND) 0.75 3.62 
 Liberia (LBR) -0.83 6.22  Iran (IRN) 2.64 11.21
 Malawi (MWI) 0.88 5.31  Iraq (IRQ) 0.88 17.47
 Mauritius (MUS) 2.19 5.87  Israel (ISR) 3.21 4.48 
 Mozambique (MOZ) -2.06 7.91  Japan (JPN) 5.24 3.62 
 Niger (NER) 0.088 8.46  Jordan (JOR) 2.47 7.35 
 Senegal (Sen) -0.057 4.59  Malaysia (MYS) 3.92 4.33 
 Sierra Leone (SLE) 0.47 5.99  Nepal (NPL) 0.89 4.14 
 South Africa (ZAF) 1.64 4.87  Pakistan (PAK) 2.21 3.78 
 Sudan (SDN) -0.29 7.59  Philippines (PHL) 1.53 3.78 
 Swaziland (SWZ) 1.59 7.51  Singapore (SGP) 5.9 4.46 
 Tanzania (TZA) 2.55 5.38  South Korea (KOR) 5.84 4.49 
 Togo (TGO) 1.95 6.61  Sri Lanka (LKA) 1.71 5.09 
 Tunisia (TUN) 3.18 3.43  Syria (SYR) 4.13 10.25
 Uganda (UGA) 0.83 12.59  Taiwan (OAN) 6.28 3.03 
 Zaire (ZAR) 0.035 7.51  Thailand (THA) 3.82 2.97 
 Zambia (ZMB) -1.73 7.11 Europe Austria (AUT) 3.27 1.9 
 Zimbabwe (ZWE) 1.68 6.19  Belgium (BEL) 2.72 2.5 
North Am, Central Am, and Caribbean  Cyprus (CYR) 4.62 10.02
 Barbados (BRB) 2.47 4.83  Denmark (DNK) 2.72 2.83 
 Canada (CAN) 2.76 2.98  Finland (FIN) 3.31 3.12 
 Costa Rica (CRI) 2.14 3.76  France (FRA) 2.97 2.04 
 Dominican Rep (DOM) 2.44 6.77  West Germany (DEU) 2.59 2.42 
 El Salvador (SLV) 1.34 4.9  Greece (GRC) 4.17 3.84 
 Guatemala (GTM) 1.11 2.86  Iceland (ISL) 3.37 4.09 
 Haiti (HTI) 0.24 4.13  Ireland (IRL) 2.39 2.87 
 Honduras (HND) 1.36 3.6  Italy (ITA) 3.35 2.76 
 Jamaica (JAM) 1.09 4.99  Malta (MLT) 5.56 4.17 
 Mexico (MEX) 2.55 3.88  Netherlands (NLD) 2.7 2.41 
 Nicaragua (NIC) 0.1 13.35  Norway (NOR) 3.61 1.84 
 Panama (PAN) 3.28 3.45  Portugal (PRT) 4.01 4.66 
 Trinidad and Tobago (TTO) 1.57 8.8  Spain (ESP) 3.08 3.51 
 United States (USA) 2.14 2.59  Sweden (SWE) 2.49 1.81 
South Am Argentina (ARG) 0.41 4.24  Switzerland (CHE) 1.53 2.44 
 Bolivia (BOL) 1.3 4.08  Turkey (TUR) 2.66 3.6 
 Brazil (BRA) 2.89 4.79  United Kingdom (GBR) 2.06 2.2 
 Chile (CHL) 0.63 6.16  Yugoslavia (YUG) 3.92 4.49 
 Colombia (COL) 2.23 3.04 Pacific Australia (AUS) 2.45 2.57 
 Ecuador (ECU) 2.67 4.94  Fiji (FJI) 1.54 5.42 
 Guyana (GUY) -1.12 9.67  New Zealand (NZL) 1.46 3.29 
 Paraguay (PRY) 2.68 5.15  Papua New Guinea (PNG) 1.34 5.72 
 Peru (PER) 0.84 4.95   
 Uruguay (URY) 0.13 5.04     
 Venezuela (VEN) 1.51 6.51     
* Source: Ramey and Ramey (1995, p.1149). 
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 Table 2. Mean growth rates and standard deviation for 66-country, 1964-93* 
 
  Mean SD   Mean SD 
Africa Botswana 7.05 8.18 S. Am Argentina 1.00 4.70 
 Burundi 2.12 6.36  Brazil 2.84 4.79 
 Cameroon 0.79 7.88  Chile 2.25 5.63 
 Chad -0.25 7.70  Colombia 2.16 1.83 
 Congo 2.55 7.01  Costa Rica 2.01 3.48 
 Ghana -0.67 5.20  Ecuador 2.35 5.72 
 Guyana 0.41 5.11  El Salvador 0.39 3.59 
 Kenya 1.88 5.25  Guatemala 0.97 2.92 
 Nigeria 0.42 7.59  Honduras 1.18 3.22 
 Oman 8.09 19.13  Mexico 1.81 3.26 
 Rwanda 0.97 5.47  Paraguay 2.16 3.93 
 Sierra Leone 0.36 4.78  Peru -0.21 5.46 
 Somalia 0.10 9.37  Puerto Rico 3.34 3.30 
 South Africa 0.12 2.74  Uruguay 1.24 4.44 
 Sudan -0.14 6.99  Venezuela -0.39 4.12 
 Swaziland 1.81 6.96 DCs Australia 1.91 2.18 
 Togo -0.08 6.20  Austria 2.86 2.06 
 Trinidad and Tobago 0.64 4.87  Belgium 2.59 2.16 
 Zaire -2.13 4.72  Canada 2.19 2.42 
 Zambia -1.41 4.56  Denmark 2.06 1.96 
 Zimbabwe 1.12 5.94  Finland 2.45 3.51 
S-E Asia Bangladesh 0.81 4.41  France 2.46 1.79 
 China 6.89 7.66  Germany 2.86 2.88 
 Hong Kong 6.08 4.30  Italy 2.94 2.38 
 India 1.88 3.43  Japan 4.49 3.33 
 Indonesia 4.03 2.53  Luxembourg 2.35 3.08 
 Korea, Republic of 7.55 3.86  Netherlands 2.13 1.90 
 Malaysia 4.34 2.92  New Zealand 1.18 3.20 
 Nepal 0.73 3.14  Norway 3.03 1.81 
 Philippines 1.08 3.52  Spain 2.85 2.53 
 Singapore 7.16 3.29  Sweden 1.59 1.96 
 Thailand 5.35 2.74  Switzerland 1.25 2.53 
     United Kingdom 1.88 2.09 
     United States 1.78 2.25 
 
*Source: World Bank (1995).
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Figure 1. A U-Shaped Curve between Volatility and the Speed of Growth
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Figure 2. The U-Shaped Curve Between Mean Growth Rate and Volatility, 92-country, 1962-85. 
Source: Summers and Heston (1991).
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Figure 3. The U-Shaped Curve Between Mean Growth Rate and Volatility, 66-country, 1964-93. 
Source: World Bank (1995). 
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 Footnotes 
                                                          
1 Such numbers are obtained from the Summers and Heston (1991) data for the period 1962-85. 
2 By putting standard deviation as the independent variable, Remay and Remay (1995) arguably 
studied the causal effect flowing from volatility to growth. This is consistent with Aizenman and 
Marion (1993) who found persistent policy uncertainty negatively affect growth by reducing 
investment. What is probably closer to the truth is that both growth and volatility are 
endogenously determined by more fundamentally exogenous variables such as liquidity 
constraints, financial liberalization, and methods of (human) capital accumulation. 
3 Many Asian countries are hit by the US economic slowdown in 2001. Singapore, having 
recovered more successfully than many others from the 1997 crisis, plunged into deeper 
recession than most - not surprising since forty-six percent of her export is electronics to the US 
market. The heavy reliance of Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore on just a few industries 
illustrates aptly the source of their income volatility. 
4 The Islamic revolution overthrew the Shah of Iran in 1979, an opportunity exploited by 
Saddam Husayn who had became President of Iraq in July that year. A protracted and costly war 
broke out in September 1980. On December 23, 1972, a powerful earthquake shook Nicaragua, 
destroying most of the capital city. The earthquake left approximately 10,000 dead and some 
50,000 families homeless, and destroyed 80 percent of Managua's commercial buildings. The 
Sandinista Revolution overthrew the corrupt Somoza regime later in the 70’s, but the effect of 
the earthquake and the revolution had profound effect on economic stability in the country. The 
murderous eight-year regime of Idi Amin in the 1970’s devastated the Uganda economy and cost 
the lives of an estimated 300,000 victims. Algeria battled against European colonialists in the 
early 1960s but the war national liberation and its aftermath severely disrupted Algeria's society 
and economy. In addition to the physical destruction, the exodus of the colons deprived the 
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country of most of its managers, civil servants, engineers, teachers, physicians, and skilled 
workers. Yet, throughout much of the decade unemployment in Algeria seldom fell below 70 
percent. Syria fought two wars, 1967 and then 1973, against Israeli. These wars toke heavy toll 
both on Assad’s regime and on the Syrian economy. The ethnic problem of Cyprus where 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots lived together on the island for almost five centuries erupted in 1974 
when the Turk army invaded Cyprus. Thousands of Cypriots lost their lives, and many more 
thousands refugees fled their country. The UN Security Council in Resolution 367/1975 "regrets 
the unilateral decision of 13 February 1975 declaring a part of the Republic of Cyprus would 
become a Federated Turkish State”. This devastated the Cyprus economy for many years to 
come. 
5 Oman’s exceptionally high growth rate and standard deviation owe much to its heavy reliance 
on the hydrocarbon sector, which went through turbulent upswings in the 1970’s and collapse in 
1985-86. We do not exclude Oman from the regressions, but its exclusion would not have made 
any significant difference in our results.  
6 In the Samuelson accelerator system it was consumption and investment that links the present 
to the past. 
7 Capital flows quite generally include both non-equity loans as well as those for direct 
investment purposes. Thus debt servicing should in principle include profit repatriation, but the 
distinction between the interest rate and profit rates is ignored since it would not significantly 
affect the argument in this paper. Principle repayment is also ignored for the sake of simplicity. 
The results of this paper do not fundamentally depend on the constancy assumption of the 
interest rate over time.  
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